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PREVIEW; United States v. Campbell: Rocky Mountain High – The 




The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 
scheduled to consider the matter of United States v. Adam Walter 
Campbell on Aug. 31, 2020 at 9:00 a.m., in the William K. Nakamura 
Courthouse, Seattle, Washington. Larry Jent will likely appear on behalf 
of the Appellant Adam Campbell. Joseph Thaggard will likely appear on 




The primary issue in this case is whether Appellant Adam 
Campbell’s manufacture of cannabis concentrates in 2016 complied with 
the Montana Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”)1 effectively enjoining the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) from prosecuting Campbell for violations 
of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)2 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.3 The Ninth Circuit’s decision 
will clarify the reach of the MMA, specifically if cannabis extracts and 
concentrates are considered marijuana as defined by the Montana Code 
Annotated § 50-32-101(18). This decision has the potential to render 
certain medicinal preparations illegal if the Ninth Circuit upholds the 
District Court’s exclusion of cannabis extracts and concentrates from the 
MMA’s definition of marijuana.4 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In May of 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) 
and the Missouri River Drug Task Force (“MRDTF”) investigated 
Montana Bud, a medical marijuana production and distribution business 
in Bozeman, Montana.5 Montana Bud was licensed to sell “marijuana-
infused products.”6 A raid uncovering significant amounts of marijuana 
plants, hashish oil, and a butane hash oil laboratory led to the indictment 
of Adam Campbell, an employee of Montana Bud and owner of the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana Class of 2022. 
1 See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301 to 344 (2015). Campbell was prosecuted in 
accordance to the 2015 version of this act, the current version does offer further clarification on 
manufacturing concentrates under the MMA. 
2 21 U.S.C.A. § 856(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158) (it is unlawful to maintain a space 
that manufactures controlled substances except as narrowly exempted within state marijuana laws). 
3 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158). 
4 United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 6728062, at *6 (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019). 
5 Appellant’s Opening Brief at *5, United States v. Campbell, (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2019) (No. 19-30115) 
[hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief].  
6 Id. at *7; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(6)(a) (marijuana-infused products contain 
marijuana and are intended for use by a registered card holder by means other than smoking). 




property it operated on.7 Campbell entered a plea agreement regarding his 
first two counts, Conspiracy to Manufacture and Distribute Controlled 
Substances,8 and Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana.9 The 
third count, Maintaining Drug Involved Premises, is at issue on this 
appeal.10  
 
Campbell moved the United States District Court for the District 
of Montana to dismiss the remaining count after presenting evidence at a 
“McIntosh Hearing.”11 Typically, in adherence with the Supremacy 
Clause, federal law takes precedence over interfering or contradicting state 
laws.12 However, the Ninth Circuit in McIntosh carved out an exception to 
this principle when it clarified the reach of a rider known as the 
“Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.”13 This rider, attached to an omnibus 
spending bill, halted the DOJ’s use of federal funds to prosecute 
individuals who violate the Controlled Substance Act while acting in 
compliance with their state’s medical marijuana laws.14 The McIntosh 
court held that defendants are entitled to an evidentiary hearing to 
determine if they acted in compliance with state law.15 The defendant must 
strictly comply with state law to enjoin the DOJ’s prosecution.16 The 
United States bears the initial burden to establish that the defendant failed 
to sufficiently comply with state law.17 
 
The United States argued that Campbell did not act in strict 
compliance with the MMA because he: (1) distributed marijuana in greater 
amounts than those condoned by the MMA; (2) distributed marijuana 
across state borders; (3) imported hash oil; and (4) manufactured and 
distributed hash oil.18 Though the Appellee raised four arguments, the 
District Court considered the last, manufacturing and distributing hash oil, 
 
7 Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *3.  
8 See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158); Campbell, 2018 WL 
6728062 at *4 (out of state possession is not in accordance with the MMA).  
9 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158); 18 U.S.C. § 2; 
Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *4 (out of state possession is not in accordance with the MMA).  
10 21 U.S.C.A. § 856(a)(1) (Campbell was indicted for owning property used to manufacture 
“hashish” and “hash oil”). 
11 United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016) (established the right for 
defendants prosecuted in violation of federal controlled substance laws to demonstrate a strict 
compliance with state marijuana laws. If strict compliance is shown, it enjoins the expenditure of 
federal funds to prosecute these defendants). 
12 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
13 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 83, 113th Cong. § 538 (2014).  
14 Id.  
15 McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1179 (this has become known as a “McIntosh Hearing”). 
16 Id.  
17 United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 6728062, at *3 (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019). The District of Montana found the government 
bears the initial burden to establish a preponderance of evidence. If proved, the burden shifts to the 
defendant. The Ninth Circuit has not provided further direction on who initially bears the evidentiary 
burden. 
18 Answering Brief of the United States at *12, United States v. Campbell, (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020) 
(No. 19-30115) [hereinafter Answering Brief]. 




dispositive.19 Relying on Montana v. Pirello,20 the District Court found 
“nothing in the MMA or the administrative rules in existence during the 
period covered by the indictment provided that hashish or hash oil is a 
substance subject to the MMA.”21 The District Court found that once 
reduced to concentrate, marijuana was not an “intact plant material” and 
could not be considered marijuana per the MMA.22 The District Court 
came to this conclusion reliant on Pirello’s differentiation between the 
concentrate “hashish” and “usable marijuna.”23 This was the only issue 
analyzed by the District Court. Campbell now appeals this decision and is 
requesting the Ninth Circuit find that cannabis concentrates are included 
within the MMA’s legal definition of marijuana.24 
 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 
Both parties’ arguments center on what the legal definition of 
marijuana encompasses. Specifically, whether cannabis concentrates are 
considered marijuana by the MMA. 
The Appellant, Campbell, claims the District Court erred by 
denying his motion to dismiss under McIntosh.25 The District Court 
interpreted marijuana-infused products to mean products made with 
“usable” or “intact” marijuana.26 This decision left mechanically 
processed or extracted materials and concentrates outside of the definition 
of marijuana, and therefore, outside the protections of the MMA and the 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.27 Campbell argues that the MMA should 
be read to include cannabis concentrates under the definition of 
marijuana.28 If the statutes cannot be reconciled to complement this 
understanding, Campbell argues the Court should resolve the ambiguities 
of the statutes by invoking the rule of lenity.29 Finally, Campbell contends 
the Court should retroactively apply amendments made to the MMA in 
2017, that clarify the use of cannabis concentrates in marijuana-infused 
products is included under the statute, to his appeal.30  
The Appellee, the United States, counters by claiming the District 
Court correctly denied Campbell’s motion to dismiss because the cannabis 
concentrates hashish and hash oil do not fall under the MMA’s definition 
 
19 Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *4. 
20 282 P.3d 662, 664–65 (Mont. 2012) (holding that hashish was not a “usable” form of marijuana). 
21 Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *4. 
22 Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *17 (citing Pirello, 282 P.3d at 664–65 (discussing the definition 
of “hashish” under the 2009 MMA)). 
23 Id. at *16.  
24 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *9. 
25 Id. at *10. 
26 Id. at *12; Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *14. 
27 Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *5. 
28 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *14. 
29 Id. at *22. The rule of lenity requires the court to apply an ambiguous criminal statute in favor of 
the defendant.  
30 Id. at *25. 




of marijuana.31 The Appellee argues that cannabis concentrates derived 
from a marijuana plant cannot classify as marijuana under the MMA 
because they are not dried plant materials.32 It further claims there was not 
a grievous ambiguity in the MMA to justify the use of the rule of lenity, 
and that the 2017 modifications to the MMA substantially changed the 
MMA instead of clarifying it; therefore the new version of the MMA 
should not retroactively apply.33  
 
A. Appellant’s Argument 
 
Campbell primarily argues that the District Court wrongfully 
denied his motion to dismiss after his McIntosh Hearing. He claims the 
District Court incorrectly interpreted the MMA when it excluded cannabis 
concentrates from the legal definition of marijuana.34 Subsequently, 
Campbell asserts the United States failed to establish, by a perponderance 
of the evidence, that Campbell was guilty since Montana Bud had a license 
to produce marijuana-infused products.35 Marijuana-infused refers to a 
product “that contains marijuana and is intended for use . . . by a means 
other than smoking” and includes “edible products, ointments, and 
tinctures.”36 The 2015 MMA authorizes a provider to “manufacture and 
provide marijuana-infused products.”37 Campbell argues “manufacture” in 
this sense includes extracting concentrates obtained from marijuana 
plants.38  
For several reasons Campbell disputes the District Court’s 
conclusion that marijuana reduced to concentrate is no longer marijuana 
under the MMA. First, the District Court incorrectly relied on“usable 
marijuana” because this term applies only to the quantity of dried 
marijuana material a registered patient or provider may possess at one 
time, not other types or forms of marijuana a provider may manufacture.39 
Next, Campbell argues Pirello has no place in this analysis because 
marijuana-infused products must contain “marijuana” not “usable 
marijuana.”40 Campbell asserts it is unrealistic to create a marijuana-
infused product in accordance with the District Court’s limitation of 
 
31 Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *20. 
32 Id. at *29–30. 
33 Id. at *31–33. 
34 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *21. 
35 Id. at *14–15; see generally United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 
6728062, at *3 (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019) (stating that 
the prosecution bears the initial burden of evidence). 
36 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(6)(a) (2015). 
37 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(13) (2015). 
38 Appellant’s Reply Brief at *2, United States v. Campbell, (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2020) (No. 19-30115) 
[hereinafter Appellant’s Reply Brief]; Appellant’s Opening Brief at *14. 
39 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *25. 
40 Id. at *16; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(6)(a), (20) (2015) (defining “usable 
marijuana” as the dried leaves and flowers of the marijuana plant and any mixtures or preparations 
of the dried leaves and flowers); contra Montana v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 664–65 (Mont. 2012) 
(holding only “usable marijuana” was protected by the MMA).  




“usable marijuana.”41 To give products such as ointments and edibles their 
medicinal properties it is necessary to extract THC, the healing factor, 
from marijuana plants. By using cannabis concentrate, the infused 
products can boast a consistent dose.42 He points out the inefficiency of 
only allowing consumption of medical marijuana in dried form and asserts 
that the District Court’s interpretation contradicts the MMA’s allowance 
of medicinal products.43 He further claims that though the Montana 
Controlled Substance Act (“MCSA”) defines the concentrate hashish 
separately from marijuana, this distinction does not support the District 
Court’s decision.44 He argues that pursuant to the MCSA, hashish, as all 
other controlled substances, is considered illegal “except as provided in 
Title 50, Chapter 46” of the Montana Code Annotated.45 Campbell asserts 
since marijuana means “all plant material from the genus Cannabis 
containing tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”)”46 and because hashish is 
derived from “marijuana plant materials” the concentrate was intended to 
classify as marijuana and does not necessitate a separate definition in the 
MMA.47 
 
If the Ninth Circuit rejects Campbell’s argument that hashish and 
other cannabis concentrates are marijuana under the MMA, he argues the 
rule of lenity should apply to his case.48 This rule favors a defendant when 
a criminal statute is found to be ambiguous.49 Campbell argues since the 
MMA allows for the sale of edible medical marijuana and other marijuana-
infused products,50 but fails to provide appropriate direction on how to 
create these medicinal products, he understandably assumed he could 
extract concentrate from marijuana plants to infuse his products with 
consistent, accurate measures of THC.51  
 
Campbell’s final argument claims that the 2017 Montana 
Legislature clarified the presumed ambiguity surrounding this issue, and 
therefore it should apply retroactively to his appeal.52 He argues the 2017 
version did not add to the 2015 MMA; instead it made clear that the 
process Montana Bud used to extract cannabis concentrate was always 
allowed.53 He contends that because hashish is a concentrate derived from 
 
41 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *23. 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 36, at *1; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(15). 
45 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102(1) (2015).  
46 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015).  
47 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *1–4. 
48 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *22. 
49 See generally United States v. Wyatt, 408 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding “when a 
criminal statute is ambiguous” it favors the defendant). 
50 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(13) (2015). 
51 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *22. 
52 Id. at *25 
53 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *3. 




the marijuana plant, though the 2015 MMA lacked the clarifying language 
of the 2017 MMA, the intent for the concentrates to be regulated by the 
MMA did not change.54 
 
B. Appellee’s Argument 
 
The United States responds to Campbell’s claim that it failed to 
surmount its burden of evidence at the McIntosh Hearing by pointing to 
two presumed deficiencies in his argument.55 It first highlights an 
interpretation of United States v. Evans that would relieve the government 
of the initial burden of proof.56 Second, if it was required to initially prove 
a lack of strict compliance by Campbell, it met its burden.57 The United 
States claims that it did demonstrate that Montana Bud and Campbell 
manufactured and distributed hash oil, which it claims is not marijuana 
defined by the MMA, and thus outside the protections of the Rohrabacher-
Farr Amendment.58 It relies heavily on Pirello, and assert that none of the 
terms “marijuana, marijuana-infused product, or usable marijuana” 
include hashish or hash oil in their definitions–therefore cannabis 
concentrates cannot be considered marijuana.59 The Appellee claims that 
the Montana Legislature intentionally chose not to define a marijuana-
infused product as containing a cannabis concentrate, and that this choice 
demonstrates the MMA does not condone a provider’s manufacture of 
cannabis concentrates.60 It attacks Campbell’s efficiency argument by 
claiming nothing stops patients and providers from only using dried 
marijuana in marijuana-infused products.61  
 
The Appellee argues that the District Court correctly ruled that the 
MMA lacked an ambiguity so uncertain that the rule of lenity must be 
applied in Campbell’s favor.62 The government denies Campbell’s 
complaint that the MMA provides for the sale of infused products without 
providing a clear understanding of how to legally infuse those products 
consistently.63 Instead, Appellee asserts that hashish and other cannabis 
concentrates clearly fall outside the plain language parameters of the 
MMA; thus there cannot be a grievous ambiguity in the language of the 
 
54 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(10) (2017) (Marijuana concentrate is “any type of marijuana 
product consisting wholly or in part of the resin extracted from any part of the marijuana plant); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(15) (2015) (“Hashish . . . is composed of resin from the cannabis 
plant”).  
55 Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *24.  
56 929 F.3d 1073, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2019) (required the defendant to first prove compliance with 
state law). 
57 Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *25. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at *26. 
60 Id. at *27. 
61 Id. at *29. 
62 Id. at *31. 
63 Id.  




statute to provide Campbell relief.64 They firmly differentiate between 
marijuana and cannabis concentrates, claiming that because the MCSA 
differentiates concentrates as “highly-condensed psychoactive resin” they 
cannot also classify as marijuana.65 
 
Finally, the Appellee denies that the 2017 modifications to the 
MMA were mere clarifications of the role of concentrates within the 
MMA.66 They assert the changes in 2017 added to the scope of the MMA, 
and as such cannot be applied retroactively.67 For current law to be applied 
to preceding criminal charges, there must be a clear intent by the 
legislature to allow for such action.68 The United States argues that no 




The deciding issue, whether cannabis concentrates fit the 
definition of marijuana under the MMA will be considered de novo.70 
Regardless of which side the Ninth Circuit comes down on, this case will 
have lasting implications that affect both qualifying patients and medical 
marijuana providers in Montana as they interpret present and future 
modifications to the MMA.  
 
Neither the arguments concerning the rule lenity or applicability 
of the 2017 MMA will contribute much to this decision. Both will likely 
fall, by default, in line with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the main 
issue. Because Montana’s medical marijuana laws have historically 
changed from legislative session to session, Campbell’s argument that the 
ambiguity of the statute should favor his position at first seems like a valid 
approach. In 2004, Montana enacted the MMA and the original version 
remained lenient until 2011, when stricter legislation took its place.71 
Again in 2015, the MMA saw changes.72 The 2015 version of the statute 
is at issue here. The clash of understanding by Campbell and the United 
States in and of itself demonstrates an ambiguity in the MMA. However, 
 
64 Id. at *32 (citing United States v. Phillips, 376 F.3d 846, 857, n. 39 (9th Cir. 2004) (The ambiguity 
must be “grievous” in nature to favor the defendant under this rule.).  
65 Id. at *33. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See generally Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005). 
69 Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *35. 
70 See generally Garmon v. County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016) (Where issues 
of statutory interpretation are considered by appellate courts as if for the first time.).  
71 Montana Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Mont. 2012); see generally 
Thomas J. Bourguignon, Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State of Montana and the 
Constitutionality of Medical Marijuana, 75 MONT. L. REV. 167, 171–72 (2014) (The 2004 act 
allowed qualifying patients access to medical marijuana, it did not restrict the number of patients a 
caregiver could assist, in 2011 the act became more restrictive, and required “objective proof” to 
become a registered cardholder; it also limited providers to three qualifying patients). 
72 See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301 through 344 (2015). 




Campbell raises the rule of lenity as a tiebreaker, not a primary issue; 
consequently, the Ninth Circuit will likely find it does not support his 
argument.73 If the Ninth Circuit agrees with his primary argument, that 
cannabis concentrates are marijuana, the rule of lenity proves unnecessary. 
However, if the Court does find that the MMA did not cover concentrates, 
it will likely reach this conclusion because it considers the 2015 MMA 
clear enough in its definitions to support the District Court’s conclusion 
that there was no grievous ambiguity in the statute’s writing.74 
 
Campbell’s request for the 2017 MMA to retroactively apply 
suffers a similar redundancy. He argues that the 2017 MMA clarified that 
his actions were legal under the 2015 MMA.75 If the Ninth Circuit concurs, 
application of the 2017 MMA is unnecessary because the 2015 MMA will 
sufficiently protect him.76 However, if the Ninth Circuit instead finds that 
cannabis concentrates are not defined as marijuana under the 2015 MMA, 
it will likely not agree with Campbell’s claim that the 2017 MMA 
clarified, rather than added to the understanding of concentrates per 
marijuana-infused products.77 
 
The crux of this case is whether cannabis concentrates constitute 
marijuana as defined by the MMA. For Campbell to prevail on this issue, 
his argument will have to overcome the District Court’s outdated 
precedent.78 In 2012, Buddy Pirello argued his criminal charges for 
possession should be dropped because he possessed the concentrate 
hashish in accordance with the MMA’s limitations of “usable 
marijuana.”79 The Court found that hashish did not meet the criteria of 
usable marijuana because the MMA defined it as “the dried leaves and 
flowers of marijuana and any mixture or preparation of marijuana.”80 The 
Court found because the plant material used to make hashish was reduced 
to resin, it not only no longer qualified as usable marijuana, it also failed 
to fit the general definition of marijuana under the MMA.81 Therefore, it 
did not classify as a medical marijuana exemption of the Controlled 
Substances Act.82 Whether Pirello correctly interpreted concentrate as 
separate from the definition of usable marijuana does not apply to 
 
73 United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 6728062, at *17 (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019). 
74 Id.; see generally United States v. Phillips, 376 F.3d 846, 857, n. 39 (9th Cir. 2004) (the ambiguity 
in the statute must be grievous to favor the defendant); Montana v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 664–65 
(Mont. 2012) (the Court would likely use this precedent to reach a conclusion the statue was 
sufficiently clear). 
75 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *25. 
76 Id. 
77 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *3–4. 
78 Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062at *14; see generally Pirello, 282 P.3d at 662. 
79 Pirello, 282 P.3d at 664–65. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 665; see generally 21 U.S.C. chp. 13 (chapter on controlled substances). 




Campbell’s issue. The issue is if cannabis concentrates fit within the 
general defintion of marijuana, not the usable marijuana definition. 
Current courts and legislature are trending towards defining cannabis 
concentrates as marijuana for purpose of state medical marijuana laws.83  
 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit will likely find that the District 
Court incorrectly relied on Pirello; both because the present case addresses 
a different issue, and Pirello has become outdated. Campbell never argued 
that cannabis concentrates are usable marijuana; he claims that 
concentrates fit the general definition of marijuana, and thus are an 
accepted component of a marijuana-infused products.84 Usable marijuana 
references the amount of dried plant material a person can possess.85 
Though Pirello does offer a Montana based precedent, the Ninth Circuit 
will likely instead apply a different, more fitting analysis that recently 
arose from Arizona in Arizona v. Jones.86 Due to the factual similarities of 
this present case and Jones, and that of Montana and Arizona’s marijuana 
laws, it is likely the Ninth Circuit will follow the Arizona Supreme Court’s 
analysis and find that cannabis concentrates are marijuana for the purposes 
of the MMA.87  
 
In Jones, the Arizona Supreme Court considered the plain 
language of that state’s statute, and found that cannabis concentrates are 
marijuana for the purposes of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act 
(“AMMA”).88 The Court closely examined the definition of marijuana, 
defined in the AMMA, as “all parts of the plant” and held that the plain 
meaning of “all” and “parts” extended to cannabis extracts and 
concentrates as they originate from parts of the marijuana plant.89 The 
Court also interpreted “manufacture” to mean making a “product suitable 
for use,” especially when creating a marijuana product not intended to be 
smoked.90After taking into consideration medical use and methods of 
consumption, the Court concluded that, though cannabis concentrates are 
not expressly stated in the AMMA’s definition of marijuana, the 
surrounding statutes implied that the extension of state medical marijuana 
laws encompassed cannabis concentrates.91 Montana and Arizona have 
 
83 E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(10) (2017) (marijuana concentrate means any marijuana 
product consisting of extracted plant material); See also Arizona v. Jones, 440 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 
2019) (Arizona’s medical marijuana act defines marijuana as including cannabis concentrates); 
People v. Mulcrevy, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (Cal. App. 3d dist. 2014) (finding concentrates are 
protected by the Compassionate Use Act).  
84 Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *1–2. 
85 Id.  
86 See generally Jones, 440 P.3d at 1139. 
87 Id. at 1144. 
88 Id. at 1142. 
89 Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142; compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015) (the Montana 
definition also includes “all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”). 
90 Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142. 
91 Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801(1), (8), (15). 




very similar statutory definitions of marijuana.92 Since the states share 
such close language, it is likely the Ninth Circuit comes to the same 
conclusion regarding the MMA that the Arizona Supreme Court came to 
regarding the AMMA. 
 
The Court in Jones referenced Pirello, and distinguished the 
Montana Court’s analysis from their own because Pirello “cross-
references and incorporates the criminal code distinction between 
marijuana and hashish.”93 However, the Ninth Circuit will likely consider 
this distinction a fault to the application of Pirello to the present case, not 
a difference between the Montana and Arizona statutes. This is likely 
because Pirello identifies the distinction between hashish and “usable 
marijuana” under the 2009 MMA, not how the 2015 MMA might allow 
for the use and manufacture of cannabis concentrates under the general 
definition of marijuana.94 The Ninth Circuit will likely focus on the 
Arizona Supreme Court’s analysis that because “resin must first be 
extracted from the plant” it “reflects that it is part of the plant.”95 This 
conclusion supports that the cannabis concentrate hashish, made from 




This Ninth Circuit decision will determine the legal definition of 
marijuana in Montana for the purposes of the MMA. If the Ninth Circuit 
affirms the District Court’s decision, it will restrict medical marijuana to 
the exclusive use of dried products, effectively banning cannabis 
concentrates and extracts. This extends to edibles and ointments that use 
cannabis concentrates to ensure a consistent measure of THC; these 
products could remain illegal under the separate definition of hashish 
found in the MCSA. Failure to reverse the District Court’s decision could 
severely limit qualifying patients’ use of medical marijuana.  
 
 
92 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015) (“marijuana means all plant material from the genus 
cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinol); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801(10) (“marijuana 
means all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”). 
93 Id. 
94 Montana v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 664–65. 
95 Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142; see generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801(10) (“marijuana means 
all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”). 
96 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015) (“marijuana means all plant material from the genus 
cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinol); see Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142 (“Taken together, ‘all parts’ 
refers to all constituent elements of the marijuana plant, and the fact the resin must first be extracted 
from the plant reflects that it is part of the plant”). 
